Wednesday, October 29, 2014

HURLEY ROGNER WELCOMES SCOTT D. NEWSOM

Seasoned Attorney Broadens Firm’s Offerings for Community Associations, Employer, and Carrier Clients

Winter Park – (October 27, 2014) – Scott D. Newsom has joined Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox, Waranch & Westcott, P.A. (HRMCW) as a senior associate in the firm’s growing commercial liability practice and for the full-service representation of community associations throughout the State of Florida.

With nearly 20 years of legal experience, Mr. Newsom works extensively with community associations of all types, including condominium, homeowners, co-op, timeshare, and commercial associations, providing full-service legal representation. He also has significant experience in real estate development, real estate litigation, construction, construction defect, commercial liability, and commercial litigation. Before entering private practice in 2003, he spent approximately six years as an assistant state attorney prosecuting felony and misdemeanor-level crimes in Florida’s 5th and 18th Judicial Circuits. His court appointments include all state courts in Florida, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Friday, October 24, 2014

UPCOMING BOARD CERTIFICATION CLASS OPPORTUNITIES

All newly elected or appointed Board members of community associations (HOA, condo, and cooperative) located in Florida must complete an educational requirement no more than 90 days from the date of election or appointment. One of the ways to satisfy this education requirement is to attend a Board Member Certification Course presented by an approved educational provider. In association with FirstService Residential property management, I am pleased to be able to announce 2 upcoming Board Certification Courses at which I will be presenting:

Wednesday, November 5, 2014 at the Tuscawilla Country Club in Winter Springs, Florida beginning at 5:30 PM

Thursday, November 6, 2014 at the Heathrow Country Club in Heathrow, Florida also beginning at 5:30 PM

This presents an opportunity to complete the statutory requirement in a less stressful environment than a classroom!

Look forward to seeing you at one of these locations.



DISCLAIMER: The information and materials on this blog are provided for general informational purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be used as, legal advice of any kind. Being general in nature, the information provided may not apply to your specific factual and/or legal set of circumstances. No attorney-client relationship is formed nor should any such relationship be implied. Nothing on this blog is intended to substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal advice, please consult with a competent attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. The content is as of the date of the post, and subsequent changes in the law may have occurred.

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

BOARD MEETING 101; VOTING BY EMAIL

As I was preparing to write a new post regarding another emotional support animal court case, I conducted a Board Certification Course that satisfies the educational component required of all newly elected or appointed board members of Florida community associations. During that Board Certification Course, I was discussing that the administration and operation of each community association was the responsibility of the Board of Directors, and that decisions and/or actions of the Association needed to be done through votes of the Board. A question was immediately raised concerning votes by Board members conducted through email. My response was that Board members could not vote on matters by email, and instead had to vote at duly noticed meetings of the Board that were open to the association's membership to attend. At that point, a near riot broke out. It was similar to the scene in the classic movie Frankenstein when the villagers took up their torches and pitchforks to hunt down the monster. That night, unfortunately, I was considered the monster. This issue presents one of the greatest challenges to members of a community association Board of Directors.

As the use of email has expanded in our everyday lives, many Board members, management companies, and community associations believe voting through email is an acceptable business practice for their community associations. I completely understand how this practice has evolved to this point, where Board members are now shocked to learn that conducting business and voting through email cannot be done. It is difficult to imagine communicating in today's society without email. When I started practicing law, almost all of the correspondence I dealt with was through actual, hard copy letters. Emails were infrequent. The requests for work to be performed by my clients came through letters delivered by the U.S. Post Office. Today, almost all of my correspondence with clients, opposing attorneys, and prospective clients is through email exclusively. Therefore, it is easy to see why Board members can be left with the impression that votes through emails, even those votes that may then end up being ratified at an actual Board meeting, would be acceptable.

Due in part to the uncertainty on this issue, the Florida Legislature in 2014 amended a portion of Chapter 718, applicable to condominium associations, to address voting by or through email. Section 718.112(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes (2014) now specifically states that while Board members of a condominium association can communicate by email, those Board members cannot cast a vote on association matters via email. It has become common over the past several legislative sessions in Florida to find amendments containing the same or similar language added or applied "across the board" to all types of community associations, but this clear prohibition on voting by email only appears in Chapter 718 for condominium associations. That prohibition did not find its way into Chapter 719 (cooperatives) or Chapter 720 (homeowners associations). I would expect this to be addressed one way or another in the 2015 legislative session, but that is a topic for another day.

Just because the legislature did not amend Chapter 720 to clearly prohibit members of homeowners association Boards of Directors from voting by email, that does not mean voting by email is still possible. This takes a little bit of deeper analysis of Chapter 617 and Section 720.303 of the Florida Statutes. Most homeowners associations in Florida are not for profit corporations, and as such are governed in part by Chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes, which is Florida's not for profit corporation act. Section 617.0801 of the Florida Statutes provides that in a not for profit corporation all "corporate powers must be exercised by or under the authority of, and the affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation" in the corporation's governing documents. This simply means that the corporation's Board of Directors exercises the corporate powers subject to limitations that may be imposed in that corporation's governing documents. For example, certain powers or duties may require a vote of the corporation's membership instead of being carried out by the Board alone.

Section 617.0824 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part that if a quorum of the Board of Directors is present at a meeting when a vote is taken, the affirmative vote of a majority of directors present is the act of the Board of Directors (unless the corporation's governing documents require a higher percentage for an action). There is a provision in Chapter 617 that would allow a Board to act without a meeting, but it must be done through a written consent (similar to a formal resolution), which has been signed by all Board members (in other words, it must be unanimous), and the corporation's governing documents (articles of incorporation and/or bylaws) must not prohibit that process. There is nothing in Chapter 617 that permits voting through email as a replacement for the unanimous written consent in lieu of conducting the vote at a Board meeting. So, almost all corporate action by the Board must be carried out at an actual Board meeting.

Section 720.303(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that a "meeting of the board of directors of an association occurs whenever a quorum of the board gathers to conduct association business. Meetings of the board must be open to all members" (except for meetings between the board and its attorney with respect to proposed or pending litigation where the contents of the discussion would otherwise be governed by the attorney-client privilege). In addition, notices of all board meetings must be posted in a conspicuous place in the community at least 48 hours in advance of a Board meeting (except in the event of an "emergency", and the term "emergency" in this context likely does not mean what most people think it means. The term is not defined in Chapter 720, but an "emergency" in this context likely refers to a state of emergency that has been declared by a governmental authority).

So, combining the provisions of Chapters 617 and 720 for actions by Board members in homeowners associations, corporate action must take place at a Board meeting and a quorum of the Board must be present at that meeting. If a quorum of the Board is present, notice of that Board meeting needed to be given at least 48 hours in advance and the Board meeting must be open to all members of the homeowners association. If Board members are voting through email, there should be several red flags raised. Corporate action (in this case, the voting) is not taking place at an actual meeting of the Board, which has been properly noticed and open to the association's membership to attend. This "virtual" meeting of the Board by conducting votes through email is not currently recognized under Florida law for community associations. The primary issue is that the votes are taking place out of sight of the association's general membership. The most common response I get to that from Board members is that the association has a difficult time getting a quorum of the Board to show up to Board meetings, let alone any participation from the other owners in the community. However, Chapter 720 and Chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes do not have a participation threshold by the association's membership before open Board meeting are required to occur. Board meetings need to be open to the association's membership regardless of how many members actually do show up (unless there is a legal basis to close the board meeting).

In a 2014 court case from the State of Illinois (Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Association), one of the issues the court was asked to address was the propriety of the condominium board voting by email. Illinois' law regarding what constitutes a board meeting is very similar to Florida's. The court held that the board of directors had violated the law by conducting votes through email. The court specifically held that, absent the applicability of identified exceptions to the requirement of holding open meetings, "all board discussion, investigating by reason or argument, talking about, presenting in detail for examination and consideration of association matters as well as voting thereon must be conducted in meetings open to the unit owners." The key point there is that votes by the directors must be conducted in meetings that are open to the association's membership. While Illinois court decisions are not binding on Florida courts, the courts in Florida can certainly take into account decisions on similar topics, especially where the applicable laws are virtually identical.

As discussed above, voting by email is not currently permitted for any community association boards of directors in Florida. Any and all votes should be conducted at properly noticed board meetings that are open to the association's membership (unless the board meeting can be closed as permitted by law). If your community association is voting by email, you should discuss this with your community association attorney to determine the proper course of action going forward and any corrective actions that may be necessary as a result.

And now I also know to make certain to pack my suit of armor when the topic of email voting comes up at my next Board Certification Course!



DISCLAIMER: The information and materials on this blog are provided for general informational purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be used as, legal advice of any kind. Being general in nature, the information provided may not apply to your specific factual and/or legal set of circumstances. No attorney-client relationship is formed nor should any such relationship be implied. Nothing on this blog is intended to substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal advice, please consult with a competent attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. The content is as of the date of the post, and subsequent changes in the law may have occurred.

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

See The Emotional Support Animal; Do He Bite?

In a classic Saturday Night Live skit, Eddie Murphy portrays a jailed poet named Tyrone Green. His poem selected for publication is entitled "Kill My Landlord", and the title of this post paraphrases one of the lines in that poem, which asks whether a watchdog does or does not bite. The importance of that line for community associations becomes evident in a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, especially for those community associations that have "no pet" policies and/or restrict certain "dangerous" dog breeds. In Warren v. Delvista Towers Condominium Association, Inc., one of the key issues was whether a pit bull terrier could not only be considered an emotional support animal, but also whether the pit bull could be kept despite a Miami-Dade County, Florida ordinance that completely banned the pit bull dog breed from the county.

The facts of the case are as follows: Paul Warren owned a unit within a condominium located in Miami-Dade County, Florida; the applicable condominium association had a "no pet" policy, which provided that all pets other than birds and fish were prohibited from being kept in the units; Mr. Warren was diagnosed by a psychiatrist as suffering from depression and post traumatic stress disorder; Mr. Warren's psychiatrist strongly recommended to the association that it make a reasonable accommodation in its "no pet" policy to allow Mr. Warren to reside with Mr. Warren's assistance animal, which was a pit bull dog (the actual breed of the dog was still being disputed, but was assumed to be a pit bull for purposes of the ruling); the psychiatrist stated that the dog had therapeutic use and function for Mr. Warren; and the condominium association refused to approve the accommodation, based on Miami-Dade County's ordinance that specifically banned the ownership of the pit bull breed. The association argued that the association could not be acting unreasonably with respect to its denial of Mr. Warren's dog since the association was acting in accordance with the ordinance.

The ordinance in question went into effect on January 1, 1990, and provided in pertinent part that "[N]o pit bull dogs may be sold, purchased, obtained, brought into Miami-Dade County, or otherwise acquired by residents of Miami-Dade County anytime after [March 31, 1990]. No such newly-acquired pit bull dogs may be kept, maintained, or otherwise harbored within Miami-Dade County, and each day any such newly-acquired pit bull is so kept, maintained, or harbored shall constitute a separate violation of [Section 5-17]"

Subsequently, Mr. Warren sued the condominium association under the Fair Housing Act over the association's refusal to grant Mr. Warren the accommodation of allowing the pit bull to reside in the unit. The Court went through the four (4) items required for a plaintiff to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim under the Fair Housing Act: (1) Mr. Warren had to establish that he was disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act; (2) that Mr. Warren requested a reasonable accommodation from the condominium association; (3) that the accommodation was necessary to give Mr. Warren an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling; and (4) that the condominium association refused to make the requested accommodation. The condominium association agreed for purposes of its motion for summary judgment that Mr. Warren had met all four requirements, but that the requested accommodation of allowing him to keep the pit bull was unreasonable based on the prohibition contained in the Miami-Dade County ordinance. The Court's review was then limited to whether Mr. Warren's request to keep the pit bull was reasonable.

The Court found that emotional support animals, as defined by the Fair Housing Act, are a reasonable accommodation, and the association had not alleged that allowing Mr. Warren to keep his pit bull would have imposed an undue burden on the association and/or that allowing him to keep the dog would have altered the nature of the association's operations. The Court further held that the Fair Housing Act carries a presumption in favor of a reasonable accommodation, so a significant risk needs to actually exist in order to deny that accommodation, and the risk cannot be remote or speculative. So, the denial cannot be based simply on the fact that the pit bull breed as a whole may be more aggressive than other dog breeds, or be perceived to present a risk generally. More importantly, the Court found that the Miami-Dade County ordinance that banned the pit bull breed was preempted by the Fair Housing Act in the context of Mr. Warren's case, as the ordinance stood as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress in enacting the Fair Housing Act in the first place, namely allowing the condominium association to prevent equal opportunities in housing based on the breed of the dog. The Court held that if the Miami-Dade County ordinance were enforced against Mr. Warren, it would violate the Fair Housing Act by permitting a discriminatory housing practice, and that Mr. Warren would not be afforded an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling.

It is important to note that the Court also recognized that there are certain instances where the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does allow for the denial of a reasonable accommodation in the form of an assistance animal if that animal's behavior poses a direct threat and the animal's owner takes no effective action to control the animal's behavior so that the threat is mitigated or eliminated. In addition, HUD has issued notices that state a request to accommodate an assistance animal can be denied if: the specific assistance animal in question poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be reduced or eliminated by another reasonable accommodation; or the specific assistance animal in question would cause substantial physical damage to the property of others that cannot be reduced or eliminated by another reasonable accommodation.

Many community associations have "no pet" policies that prohibit dogs entirely, and many community associations have prohibitions or restrictions on certain "aggressive" or "dangerous" breeds of dogs from being in the community. Unless the decision in Warren is appealed or revised in some way as the case progresses, an owner arguably can now have and keep a pit bull or similar breed of dog despite such restrictions in the community's governing documents if the owner can show the four items required to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim under the Fair Housing Act, as described above, when the dog in question is the reasonable accommodation being requested. Therefore, Tyrone Green's rhetorical question of whether the watchdog (or emotional support animal) bites becomes important for those community associations, which must demonstrate and be able to document that the specific pit bull or similar "aggressive" breed of dog being requested to be kept by an owner as an accommodation under the Fair Housing Act actually poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the community, and that threat cannot be reduced or eliminated by another reasonable accommodation.

Due to the complexity of the Fair Housing Act cases, and the potentially significant monetary penalties associated with violations of that Act, if an issue regarding an emotional support animal or whether an owner requires a reasonable accommodation arises, a community association should contact its association attorney immediately. Otherwise, the association may end up being "bitten" by the consequences of a violation of the Fair Housing Act, and Tyrone Green will finally have an affirmative answer to his question.



DISCLAIMER: The information and materials on this blog are provided for general informational purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be used as, legal advice of any kind. Being general in nature, the information provided may not apply to your specific factual and/or legal set of circumstances. No attorney-client relationship is formed nor should any such relationship be implied. Nothing on this blog is intended to substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal advice, please consult with a competent attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. The content is as of the date of the post, and subsequent changes in the law may have occurred.

Thursday, August 14, 2014

Are Restrictive Endorsements Restrictive Once Again?

A recent court decision should make community associations, commercial associations, and their respective management companies think twice before depositing payments that contain restrictive endorsements from owners, especially those who are delinquent or seriously behind in the payment of assessments. An example of a restrictive endorsement would be if an owner wrote “Account Paid In Full” on the front or back of a check submitted to the community association or the management company. An owner may also send in a payment with a letter that says the owner is intending the enclosed payment to bring the owner’s account current.

In St. Croix Lane Trust & M.L. Shapiro, Trustee v. St. Croix at Pelican Marsh Condominium Association, there was a dispute in the amount of past due assessments for a condominium unit. The owner of the condominium unit sent in a payment of $840, and the condominium association was seeking in excess of $38,000. Along with the payment, the owner sent a letter to the association stating that the check was being “tendered in full and final satisfaction of all claims” made against the owner and the unit. The association accepted the payment, applied it to the account, and considered it a partial payment pursuant to Section 718.116(3), which describes how payments received by an association are to be applied, regardless of any restrictive endorsement or instruction placed on or accompanying the payment. Chapter 720 contains similar language applicable to homeowners associations.

In the St. Croix Lane Trust case, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal, held that Section 673.3111 of the Florida Statutes rather than Section 718.116(3) applied based on the facts of the case. Section 673.3111 provides in pertinent part that: (i) if a person makes a payment intending for that to be payment in full of a disputed debt; (ii) the amount of the debt is in dispute; (iii) includes a statement on the payment itself or an accompanying written communication that the payment was made to fully satisfy the debt; (iv) and the creditor accepts the payment, the entire debt will be considered to have been settled. This concept is also referred to as “accord and satisfaction”.

The Court held that because the condominium association accepted the $840 payment, which was accompanied by the owner’s letter that the payment was intended to fully pay the disputed debt, the association’s claim was completely settled through accord and satisfaction, and the association was not entitled to the additional $37,000+ on the account.

This court decision was just issued on August 8, 2014, and is subject to possible rehearing or appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. But the implications of this decision could have immediate impact. It is important for a community association and commercial association, if it has delinquent accounts, to discuss the potential impact of this court decision with its association attorney in order to determine how payments with restrictive endorsements or payments accompanied by letters with such language are going to be handled by the attorney, the management company, or whoever else is involved in collections of delinquent accounts in order to avoid potentially disastrous consequences.



DISCLAIMER: The information and materials on this blog are provided for general informational purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be used as, legal advice of any kind. Being general in nature, the information provided may not apply to your specific factual and/or legal set of circumstances. No attorney-client relationship is formed nor should any such relationship be implied. Nothing on this blog is intended to substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal advice, please consult with a competent attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. The content is as of the date of the post, and subsequent changes in the law may have occurred.